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Abstract—DDoS attacks are increasingly used by ‘hackers’
and ‘hacktivists’ for various purposes. A number of on-line
tools are available to launch an attack of significant intensity.
These attacks lead to a variety of losses at the victim’s end.
We analyse the impact of Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS)
attack announcements over a period of 5 years on the stock prices
of the victim firms. We propose a method for event studies that
does not assume the cumulative abnormal returns to be normally
distributed, instead we use the empirical distribution for testing
purposes. In most cases we find no significant impact on the stock
returns but in cases where a DDoS attack creates an interruption
in the services provided to the customer, we find a significant
negative impact.
Index Terms—Abnormal Returns, Event Study, Cyber
Security, DDoS Attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The trend of significant growth in the magnitude of high
intensity DDoS attacks has been consistent in the past years
[1] and these attacks have resulted in heavy losses for firms
[2]. The rise in the number of attacks being encountered
can be attributed to the ample availability of online tools
for launching DDoS attacks. Booter websites have become
successful in creating a market for themselves and as a
consequence technical knowledge is no longer a prerequisite
for launching a DDoS attack [3].
The losses encountered by firms due to these cyber assaults
can be divided into direct and indirect ones [4]. Financial
damages due to infrastructural downtime, loss of online traffic,
paid ransom and customer compensation etc. are accounted
as direct losses. Indirect losses include damage to company’s
reputation and impact at stock prices etc. We examine the
indirect loss due to the decrease in the market value of a firm
as a result of an announcement of getting hit by a DDoS
attack. In Section II we discuss several studies on the impact
of information security breaches on the stock prices [5].
In our study, we consider all DDoS attacks reported after
2010. We do this in order to understand the effects caused
by these announcements. Unlike earlier studies we will study
the impact of DDoS attack announcements only, because these
attacks do not lead to any form of information leaks and do
not pose any danger to customer data. Hence, in our sample
we do not consider any of the events where DDoS has been
used as a smoke screen.
II. PREVIOUS WORK
Event studies measure the impact of company related events
on the market value of the firm. MacKinlay [12] discusses
the procedure for conducting an event study and also the
various models that can be used for estimation of normal
behaviour of the market. In the past many researchers have
studied the impact of information technology related events on
the market value of the firm. Santos et al. [13] examined the
impact of information technology investment announcements
on the market value of the firm and suggested that there is no
significant impact of these investment announcements on the
market value.
Previous studies [6, 7, 9, 10] have used a one-factor market
model for the estimation of stock prices as shown in Equation
1. Where rit represents the rate of return of the stock i and
rmt represents the rate of return of the market index on day
t. For instance, rit can be calculated as (Pit − Pit−1)/Pit−1,
where Pit is the price of the stock on day t.
rit = αi + βirmt + it (1)
The parameters α and β are firm dependent coefficients.
αˆ and βˆ are their ordinary least square (OLS) estimators.
The stochastic variable it is the error term with E [it] = 0.
Gordon et al. [11] uses a Fama-French three factor model [14]
to predict the stock prices. The three factors being company
size, company price-to-book ratio and market risk. The three
factor model is shown in Figure 2.
rit = ai + birmt + siSMBt + hiHMLt + it, (2)
SMBt is the difference between the return on the portfolio
of small stocks and the return on the portfolio of large stocks
on day t and HMLt is the difference between the return
on a portfolio of low-book-to-market stocks and the return
on a portfolio of low-book-to-market stocks on day t. The
1This paper has been published in the proceedings of 2017, 25th Euromicro
International conference on Parallel, Distributed, and Network-Based
Processing (PDP). This is a pre-final version, publisher made some changes
before publication.
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TABLE I: Previous works on impact on victim stock prices.
Author Estimation Model Sample Size Breach Type Conclusion Sample Period
[6] Hovav & D’Arcy (2003) Market Model 23 DoS
No significant impact of DoS attacks
on the capital market. Some
indication of impact on firms that rely
on the web for their business.
1998-2002
[7] Campbell et al. (2003) Market Model 43 Generic
Some negative stock market impact to
reported information security
breaches.
1995-2000
[8] Garg et al. (2003) N/A 22 Generic
Average fall in the stock price was
approximately 2.9% over a 2-day and
3.6% over 3-day period.
1996-2002
[9] Cavusoglu et al. (2004) Market Model 66 Generic
Security breach announcements affect
the values of the announcing firms
and also the Internet security
developers.
1996-2001
[10] Kannan et al. (2007) Market Model 102 Generic Drop of 1.4% in the market valuationrelative to the control group of firms. 1997-2003
[11] Gordon et al. (2011) Fama-French Model 258 Generic
Pre 9/11 information security
breaches showed significant negative
stock market returns but the results
for the post 9/11 period were not
significant.
1995-2007
parameters ai,bi,si and hi are Fama and French three-factor
model estimated firm dependent coefficients. The stochastic
variable it is the error term with E [it] = 0.
These studies [6, 7, 10] use abnormal returns (additive)
and cumulative abnormal returns (additive) as a measure of
event impact. Equations 3 and 4 show the relations used to
compute abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns
respectively. As they assume normal distribution for the CAR
values hence they use Z statistic to test their hypothesis.
ARit = rit − (αˆi + βˆirmt) (3)
CARn =
n∑
t=−1
ARit (4)
Past studies have been conducted on evaluating the impact
of information security breaches on the prices of the victim
firm’s shares. Table I lists selected works and their conclusions.
In this table we also take a look on the sample size and period
of the sample considered by these studies.
Previous studies had a mixed response on the impact of
denial of service attacks on the stock returns of the victim
firms. Some studies like Garg et al. [8] and Hovav & D’Arcy
[6] suggest that DDoS attack announcements lead to a negative
abnormal returns, while Gordon et al. [11] deny the effect
of these attacks on the market value of the firm. Spanos &
Angelis [5] conducted a systematic literature review on the
impact of information security events on the stock market
and concluded that the events examined created a significant
impact on the stock price of the firms.
Historical stock
Prices(Ri)
(200 days)
S&P 500
Index Values (Rm)
Calculation of
rates (ri, rm)
Multiplicative model
Calculation of
abnormal returns ARi
Generation of
random scenarios
Determining the position
of actual scenario
Data Collection
Analysis
Fig. 1: Method for event study. (Our contribution in Italics.)
III. METHOD
To analyse the impact of DDoS attack announcements on
stock returns we use the method as shown in Figure 1. We
can broadly divide the method into two sections:
1) Data collection.
2) Analysis
Our contribution to the analysis is at two instances. Firstly,
we use a multiplicative model for the estimation of return rates
and secondly, we use the empirical distribution of abnormal
returns by generation of random scenarios for the analysis.
In Section III-A we explain the approach for data collection.
Section III-B deals with the identification of the impact caused
by the announcements.
A. Data Collection
In this study we consider all DDoS attack announcements
that were made on the web since ‘Operation Payback’,
launched by Anonymous in December, 2010. Table II shows
the final list of all announcements that we analysed. For each
attack we collected the date of announcement, the company
type and also the services disrupted. The initial list consisted
of 43 announcements.
We further filtered the list using the following criteria:
1) If multiple announcements were made on consecutive
days, then the earliest date was considered.
2) All announcements regarding companies that were not
publicly traded at the time of attack were eliminated.
3) All attack announcements in which DDoS attack was
coupled with information theft were also not considered
for analysis. This was done in order to be able to see
the isolated effect of a DDoS attack announcements on
the firm’s stock price.
The stock prices for all the firms in the sample were
collected by using the Yahoo! finance API. For measuring the
market rate we collected the S&P 500 index values.The final
sample consisted of 35 announcements.
B. Analysis
We depart from the familiar research strategy for event
studies for the following reasons. We wish to avoid the
widespread practice of approximating multi-day returns by
simply adding up the corresponding single-day returns1 and
instead use the exact ones. Secondly, we want to avoid
the equally wide-spread assumption about short-term returns
being (approximately) distributed according to a normal,
i.e., Gaussian, distribution. We refrain from imposing as an
alternative one of the better known distributions such as the
Weibull or the Erlang distributions, as the problem generally
is not only skewness (asymmetry) but fatness of both tails,
i.e., realisations quite far from the average are more common
than for instance in the normal distribution with the same
mean and variance. Another route not taken is to use the data
consisting of a sample of returns for a period of 200 days
prior to the event, and tone of these alternative distributions
to the data. Instead we assume that the one-day returns follow
an unknown distribution which we are going to approximate
by the empirical distribution, i.e., the distribution of the
200-day-sample returns.
1Note that a 10% increase, followed by a 10% decrease imply a total
decrease of 1% according to the multiplicative formula (1.1)(0.9) = 0.99.
The additive approximation would yield a 0% change, an overestimation of
1%.
We acknowledge the considerable merits of the widespread
research strategy involving these two approximations as they
subsequently allow the construction of test variables which
follow the Student’s t-distribution in order to engage in the
testing of hypotheses.
As we do not use the approximations central to this research
strategy, we are faced with the challenge of establishing a
pertinent distribution for similar hypothesis testing. We do this
by the technique of bootstrapping (e.g., Efron [15]) which in
our case involves generating a sufficiently large number of
multi-day returns by drawing from the empirical distribution
a number of consecutive one-day returns corresponding to
the number desired. With such a series of one-day returns
we compute the exact multi-day returns, and proceed in the
same fashion to obtain a large number (in our case 5 million)
of such multi-day returns. The relative frequencies of this
large population of exact multi-day returns are then employed
as the relevant distribution for hypothesis testing. Note that
the standard approach in event studies is to take as the null
hypothesis that the event has no influence at all, meaning
in statistical terms that the distribution of returns before the
event and the one after the event are identical. So, under this
assumption the sample returns can be indeed used to generate
the relevant distributions of multi-day returns.
We consider a multiplicative model to represent the normal
behaviour of the market. According to the model if rit
represents the rate of return of the stock i on day t and rmt
represents the rate of return of the market index on day t, then
the model can be represented mathematically by Equation 6.
Rate of return can be calculated as shown in Equation 5, where
Rit and Rmt represent the stock price and market index for
day t. The value of the market index shows the average of
returns of all the firms included in the market index.
rit =
Rit −Ri(t−1)
Ri(t−1)
rmt =
Rmt −Rm(t−1)
Rm(t−1)
(5)
(1 + rit) = αi(1 + rmt)
βi (6)
A multiplicative model1 is used to estimate the returns on
a firm’s stock. In this study we use the Standard and Poor’s
(S&P) 500 as the index of the market. S&P 500 has been used
as a market study in many of the previous event studies. The
parameters αi and βi are firm dependent and will be estimated.
Equation 6 is linearised in Equation 7. The stochastic
variable it is the error term with E [it] = 0. We use ordinary
least square (OLS) estimation to obtain estimations ̂lnαi and
βˆi for lnαi and βi by considering daily returns over a period
of 200 days. This period starts 201 days before the date of
announcement and ends 2 days before the announcement. In
this study we will call this the estimation period. This length
1If the returns rit and rmt are extremely small a linear relationship between
these variable will give a good approximation.
TABLE II: Sample of DDoS attack events.
Organisation Announcement Date Source Infrastructure Firm Type
Master Card 8-12-2010 spiegel.de Website Financial Services
Visa 8-12-2010 spiegel.de Website Financial Services
Bank of America 27-12-2010 infosecisland.com Website Financial Services
Vodafone 5-10-2011 infosecurity-magazine.com None Telecommunications
Apple 29-5-2012 att-iphone-unlock.com Website IT
AT&T 16-8-2012 pcworld.com None Telecommunications
Wells Fargo 20-12-2012 technologybanker.com DNS Financial Services
JP Morgan Chase 13-3-2013 scmagazine.com Website Financial Services
TD Canada Trust 21-3-2013 thestar.com E Services Financial Services
American Express Company 28-3-2013 bankinfosecurity.com Website Financial Services
International Netherlands Group 9-4-2013 nrc.nl Payment Services Financial Services
Linkdin 21-6-2013 news.softpedia.com Website Social Networking
Microsoft 27-11-2013 scmagazine.com DNS IT/Gaming
Royal Bank of Scotland 4-12-2013 theguardian.com Banking Services Financial Services
JP Morgan Chase 30-1-2014 bobsguide.com Online Banking Services Financial Services
Bank of America 30-1-2014 bobsguide.com Online Banking Services Financial Services
Facebook 21-2-2014 nos.nl Messageing Services Social Networking
Activision Blizzard 29-3-2014 ign.com Gaming Services Gaming
Danske Bank 10-7-2014 ddosattacks.net Website Financial Services
Storebrand 10-7-2014 ddosattacks.net Website Insurance Company
Gjensidige Forsikr 10-7-2014 ddosattacks.net Website Insurance Company
Sony Corporation 24-8-2014 techcrunch.com Gaming Services IT
Amazon 27-8-2014 shacknews.com Twitch Streamers E-commerce
Activision Blizzard 14-11-2014 eurogamer.net Gaming Services Gaming
Sony Corporation 26-11-2014 wiwo.de Gaming Services IT
Rackspace 22-12-2014 welivesecurity.com DNS Hosting
Microsoft 24-12-2014 krebsonsecurity.com Gaming Services IT/Gaming
Sony Corporation 24-12-2014 krebsonsecurity.com Gaming Services IT
Alibaba Group 25-12-2014 ddosattacks.net Cloud Services E-commerce
Nordea Bank 4-1-2015 ddosattacks.net Online Banking Services Financial Services
Facebook 27-1-2015 gizmodo.com.au Website Social Networking
Amazon 16-3-2015 scmagazineuk.com Twitch Streamers E-commerce
EA Sports 18-3-2015 ibtimes.com Gaming Services Gaming
Ziggo 18-8-2015 emerce.nl DNS Telecommunications
Overstock.com 3-9-2015 ddosattacks.net DNS E-commerce
of the estimation period is consistent with the previous event
studies [6, 11, 13].
ln(1 + rit) = ln(αi) + βi ln(1 + rmt) + it (7)
The abnormal return measures the deviation that the stock
shows from the model we calculate. AR is calculated for the
estimation period and is given by Equation 8. Hence, abnormal
returns can be calculated by using Equation 9.
ln(1+ARit) = [ln(1+ rit)− [l̂n(αi) + βˆi ln(1+ rmt)]] (8)
ARit =
(1 + rit)
αˆi(1 + rmt)βˆi
− 1 (9)
The estimator2 l̂n(α) is good for ln(α) but cannot be used to
estimate αˆ. Hence, for estimating αˆ we make use of Equation
10, that is derived using Equation 7.
αˆi =
∑T
t=1(1 + rit)∑T
t=1(1 + rmt)
βˆi
, (10)
2Note that αˆ is not el̂n(α) as E [α] 6= E [lnα].
where T is the total number of days in the estimation period.
In order to measure the impact of the announcements on the
stock return we define five event periods as shown in Figure
2. These are:
1) One day prior to the announcement to the day of
announcement [t− 1, t].
2) One day prior to the announcement to 1 days after it
[t− 1, t+ 1].
3) One day prior to the announcement to 3 days after it
[t− 1, t+ 3].
4) One day prior to the announcement to 5 days after it
[t− 1, t+ 5].
5) One day prior to the announcement to 10 days after it
[t− 1, t+ 10].
We consider the starting point of the event period one
day prior to the announcement so as to accommodate for
information leaks. We randomly draw 2,3,5,7 and 12 abnormal
returns from the estimation period to represent the abnormal
returns for event periods [−1, 0], [−1, 1], [−1, 3], [−1, 5] and
[−1, 10] respectively. We generate five million possible
random scenarios for the event periods. Recall, we do not
assume the abnormal returns to be normally distributed at any
point. This is done to improve the accuracy of our results.
−201 −1−2 5 100 1 3
Estimation Period
[−201,−2]
[−1, 10]
[−1, 5]
[−1, 0]
[−1, 1]
[−1, 3]
Event Periods
Fig. 2: Estimation and Event Periods.
Fig. 3: Empirical distribution of two-day CAR values for ING.
We consider short event periods of 2 days, 3 days, 5 days, 7
days and 12 days respectively in accordance with the results
of previous studies [6, 8, 11].
For evaluating the combined effect over a certain number
of days we also calculate cumulative abnormal returns for
the randomly generated scenarios. CAR is calculated using
relation shown in Equation 11. Where, N1 and N2 represent
the start and ending days of the event period. The actual ARs
and CARs for the event period are calculated using Equations
8 and 11 respectively on the real stock data for the event
periods. It is important to note that previous studies have
assumed these cumulative abnormal returns to be normally
distributed for strategic convenience. We use the empirical
distribution of CAR for analytical purposes, i.e. for hypothesis
testing.
CAR =
N2∏
t=N1
(1 +ARit)− 1 (11)
Finally, to determine the effect of the announcement
on the daily stock return rates we check where do the
cumulative actual abnormal returns lie in the distribution
of simulated cumulative abnormal returns (multiplicative).
Figure 3 shows an example of the distribution two-day CAR
values for International Netherlands Group. A highly unlikely
negative CAR value will represent a negative impact of the
announcement and the actual scenario will fit to the extreme
left of the probability distribution. For our analysis we consider
10 percentile of the scenarios on the left to be representative
of a negative impact and 10 percentile of the scenarios on the
right represent the positive impact. Hence, for the evaluation
of the results we use the decision rule as shown in Figure 4.
CAR No Significant Impact
Positive Impact
Negative Impact
10 < %ile < 90
CAR < 0
%ile < 10
CAR > 0
%ile > 90
Fig. 4: Decision Rule.
IV. RESULTS
The complete results for our study are shown in Table
III in Appendix A. According to the results of our analysis
we observe a significant negative impact in the case of
International Netherlands Group and EA sports. Whereas, a
delayed negative effect is noticeable in the case of Bank of
America, Storebrand and Nordea Bank. In most cases we do
not see a negative effect on the victim stock prices.
In cases where the announcements state that the availability
of the infrastructure under attack did not affect the customers,
no significant impact was noticed. For example, in the case of
Visa and MasterCard the infrastructure under attack was their
website but the customers were still able to use their cards
for payment purposes. Whereas in the case of International
Netherlands Group, customers had troubles using the payment
services. Similarly, in the case of EA Sports, gamers were not
able to log onto their on-line gaming accounts.
In the case of Ziggo, the customers did face troubles due to
the unavailability of internet services but as the firm is a part
of a bigger conglomerate Liberty Global, we were unable to
spot any significant impact on the stock prices.
V. CONCLUSION
As a conclusion, we can say that there is a noticeable
negative impact on the stock prices of the victim firm whenever
the attack causes interruptions to the services provided by the
firm to its customers. This drop is consistent with the results
of the previous studies [6, 8]. However, it is not possible to
comment on the intensity of the impact because it is firm
dependent.
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APPENDIX
A: Complete Results.
TABLE III: Results of analysis.
Company CAR CAR Percentile Impact Event Period
-0.015882584 26.9273 None [-1,0 ]
-0.027930361 19.52314 None [-1,1 ]
MasterCard -0.025912927 27.83942 None [-1,3 ]
0.107126511 97.48828 Positive [-1,5 ]
0.135604103 97.36842 Positive [-1,10 ]
-0.028139803 12.72802 None [-1,0 ]
-0.040441177 9.26076 Negative [-1,1 ]
Visa -0.047573044 11.8319 None [-1,3 ]
0.140838043 99.09936 Positive [-1,5 ]
0.112939429 94.97662 Positive [-1,10 ]
-0.024699949 19.20136 None [-1,0 ]
-0.024230469 24.77702 None [-1,1 ]
Bank of America -0.031326586 24.99882 None [-1,3 ]
-0.092847266 3.46072 Negative [-1,5 ]
-0.128977999 2.344 Negative [-1,10 ]
0.000824461 51.7293 None [-1,0 ]
0.00794087 65.27714 None [-1,1 ]
Vodafone 0.004882324 57.58806 None [-1,3 ]
-0.012009277 35.3259 None [-1,5 ]
-0.011377693 39.66936 None [-1,10 ]
-0.027029116 11.10264 None [-1,0 ]
-0.023728852 18.3817 None [-1,1 ]
Apple -0.005504079 42.55964 None [-1,3 ]
-0.005196594 44.34158 None [-1,5 ]
0.001828533 51.35376 None [-1,10 ]
0.00547585 73.01768 None [-1,0 ]
0.014332099 89.90238 None [-1,1 ]
AT&T 0.024144556 94.53076 Positive [-1,3 ]
0.014879076 80.10654 None [-1,5 ]
0.027903421 88.6526 None [-1,10 ]
0.002251211 57.74708 None [-1,0 ]
0.002846928 58.18658 None [-1,1 ]
Wells Fargo 0.006975269 64.68026 None [-1,3 ]
0.010258418 67.66082 None [-1,5 ]
0.006787068 60.10972 None [-1,10 ]
-0.007305775 30.4058 None [-1,0 ]
0.013550503 77.18096 None [-1,1 ]
JP Morgan Chase 0.031340549 90.29374 Positive [-1,3 ]
0.053073337 96.23408 Positive [-1,5 ]
0.09046202 98.84216 Positive [-1,10 ]
-0.001108209 43.57652 None [-1,0 ]
-0.009229913 14.02556 None [-1,1 ]
TD Canada Trust -0.005118312 32.22566 None [-1,3 ]
-0.013999826 13.95322 None [-1,5 ]
0.023281975 91.56936 Positive [-1,10 ]
-0.00041386 51.144 None [-1,0 ]
-0.003047091 43.91128 None [-1,1 ]
American Express 0.006055721 63.35356 None [-1,3 ]
0.025735512 86.15674 None [-1,5 ]
0.050253429 94.5455 Positive [-1,10 ]
TABLE III continued.
Company CAR CAR Percentile Impact Event Period
-0.053961291 2.95846 Negative [-1,0 ]
-0.06072401 4.1384 Negative [-1,1 ]
International Netherlands Group -0.020229264 34.1261 None [-1,3 ]
-0.029848597 30.17358 None [-1,5 ]
-0.081706673 12.26994 None [-1,10 ]
0.016841037 74.30582 None [-1,0 ]
-0.002526331 46.45178 None [-1,1 ]
LinkedIn -0.017375856 34.262 None [-1,3 ]
-0.026284125 30.81402 None [-1,5 ]
-0.045621561 26.63628 None [-1,10 ]
-0.017162556 18.47456 None [-1,0 ]
-0.024200351 16.51522 None [-1,1 ]
Microsoft -0.034090835 15.74556 None [-1,3 ]
-0.015471464 36.68258 None [-1,5 ]
0.034940648 76.79054 None [-1,10 ]
0.007847170 62.39716 None [-1,0 ]
-0.007792594 44.4221 None [-1,1 ]
Royal Bank of Scotland -0.014817017 40.55122 None [-1,3 ]
0.048606528 79.92352 None [-1,5 ]
0.026742735 65.6532 None [-1,10 ]
0.004977842 64.09092 None [-1,0 ]
0.014513902 80.37984 None [-1,1 ]
JP Morgan Chase 0.000234979 49.82888 None [-1,3 ]
-0.014250438 29.04242 None [-1,5 ]
-0.031128703 18.06696 None [-1,10 ]
-0.000184061 46.84568 None [-1,0 ]
0.016315624 80.3436 None [-1,1 ]
Bank of America 0.017620533 76.0839 None [-1,3 ]
0.004226565 55.21462 None [-1,5 ]
0.025992899 75.85016 None [-1,10 ]
-0.007029030 29.70018 None [-1,0 ]
-0.009490565 28.69322 None [-1,1 ]
Facebook 0.024868377 73.9342 None [-1,3 ]
0.047184864 86.43622 None [-1,5 ]
0.092061897 95.16446 Positive [-1,10 ]
0.001928050 54.8177 None [-1,0 ]
0.001096061 52.14442 None [-1,1 ]
Activision Blizzard -0.016714484 24.34886 None [-1,3 ]
-0.006333017 41.35782 None [-1,5 ]
-0.062767985 4.28474 Negative [-1,10 ]
-0.000274242 47.75408 None [-1,0 ]
-0.016656729 24.76632 None [-1,1 ]
Danske Bank -0.014954993 31.98618 None [-1,3 ]
0.008732713 58.03892 None [-1,5 ]
-0.007350568 44.4036 None [-1,10 ]
-0.004439445 35.08586 None [-1,0 ]
-0.018229923 15.0597 None [-1,1 ]
Storebrand -0.063078035 0.4896 Negative [-1,3 ]
-0.061395155 1.39984 Negative [-1,5 ]
-0.049772166 7.76122 Negative [-1,10 ]
0.000963002 49.70118 None [-1,0 ]
0.003381149 54.0087 None [-1,1 ]
Gjensidige Forsikr -0.010505422 37.04708 None [-1,3 ]
-0.040286066 15.8641 None [-1,5 ]
-0.028966577 29.2466 None [-1,10 ]
0.002407147 60.15424 None [-1,0 ]
0.004563586 62.29666 None [-1,1 ]
Sony Corporation 0.001822970 58.2152 None [-1,3 ]
-0.021498560 37.79418 None [-1,5 ]
0.014746326 63.87318 None [-1,10 ]
TABLE III continued.
Company CAR CAR Percentile Impact Event Period
0.021753872 88.64916 None [-1,0 ]
0.016990920 78.1646 None [-1,1 ]
Amazon -0.036447006 11.17068 None [-1,3 ]
-0.043888322 11.2798 None [-1,5 ]
-0.038297272 21.30828 None [-1,10 ]
-0.000709556 48.81262 None [-1,0 ]
-0.007735669 39.30916 None [-1,1 ]
Activision Blizzard 0.004492289 56.1743 None [-1,3 ]
-0.002983879 48.68772 None [-1,5 ]
0.087616411 92.7746 Positive [-1,10 ]
-0.003403517 44.67244 None [-1,0 ]
-0.010883831 36.797 None [-1,1 ]
Sony Corporation -0.000200726 50.39402 None [-1,3 ]
0.026361475 68.49948 None [-1,5 ]
0.026080234 64.358 None [-1,10 ]
0.014832688 88.2169 None [-1,0 ]
0.025240246 94.41064 Positive [-1,1 ]
Rackspace 0.043310538 97.7079 Positive [-1,3 ]
0.040679243 94.7607 Positive [-1,5 ]
0.040587064 89.53928 None [-1,10 ]
-0.018099374 21.19232 None [-1,0 ]
-0.012956852 32.89316 None [-1,1 ]
Microsoft 0.019714934 71.0867 None [-1,3 ]
0.028748607 74.6767 None [-1,5 ]
-0.021794832 37.10918 None [-1,10 ]
0.017723392 92.3236 Positive [-1,0 ]
0.026038429 94.92672 Positive [-1,1 ]
Sony Corporation 0.029414053 92.04924 Positive [-1,3 ]
0.04572172 96.4814 Positive [-1,5 ]
0.037697846 87.84194 None [-1,10 ]
0.003252883 55.78888 None [-1,0 ]
0.006038200 58.02368 None [-1,1 ]
Alibaba Group 0.027994135 73.14122 None [-1,3 ]
0.028993768 71.19542 None [-1,5 ]
0.064338831 82.87406 None [-1,10 ]
-0.010079453 26.95334 None [-1,0 ]
0.002073589 55.11578 None [-1,1 ]
Nordea Bank -0.030816091 12.2077 None [-1,3 ]
-0.061577132 2.58652 Negative [-1,5 ]
-0.174724652 0.0002 Negative [-1,10 ]
0.012003977 73.88932 None [-1,0 ]
-0.007382446 39.45172 None [-1,1 ]
Facebook 0.034738393 85.06418 None [-1,3 ]
0.030894154 78.7436 None [-1,5 ]
0.028141425 71.76988 None [-1,10 ]
-0.001261847 48.43654 None [-1,0 ]
-0.007662918 39.32008 None [-1,1 ]
Amazon -0.014995234 34.24676 None [-1,3 ]
-0.003671321 48.09398 None [-1,5 ]
0.002219653 53.17424 None [-1,10 ]
-0.026102614 10.94388 None [-1,0 ]
-0.044632962 5.67572 Negative [-1,1 ]
EA Sports -0.052965749 7.55248 Negative [-1,3 ]
-0.020028623 30.5396 None [-1,5 ]
-0.034627666 26.39366 None [-1,10 ]
0.009412519 73.84972 None [-1,0 ]
0.037493964 94.77486 Positive [-1,1 ]
Liberty Global 0.099809937 99.5675 Positive [-1,3 ]
0.101846496 99.21738 Positive [-1,5 ]
0.106292715 98.23724 Positive [-1,10 ]
0.000637514 52.07072 None [-1,0 ]
-0.018705128 30.38584 None [-1,1 ]
Overstock.com -0.023468622 31.49814 None [-1,3 ]
-0.003278425 49.49494 None [-1,5 ]
0.010503096 58.08244 None [-1,10 ]
